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INTRODUCTION

In 2002, researchers at the Louisiana Sea Grant Legal Program began a comprehensive examination of the utility of several
environmental laws to protect Louisiana's coastline from damage
caused by oil and gas activity on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS). 1 This research focused on the power of the states under
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), and National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) to force the federal government to do a better job of
accounting for and mitigating environmental damage occasioned
by the direct, cumulative, and indirect impacts of OCS oil and gas
activity. 2 The approach proposed in this research was not novel.
Indeed, Louisiana had already tried to use these laws in this manner once before, with disappointing results. 3 However, this research did present a careful analysis of these laws with a proposal
for employing them, once again, to attempt to protect Louisiana's
coastal zone. The opportunity to put this research to the test
arose again before the results were published. This article summarizes the experience of the State of Louisiana (the State or Louisiana) in this recent challenge against the federal government
and critically analyzes the results.
1. The results of this research are contained in Carolyn R. Langford, Marcelle S.
Morel, James G. Wilkins, & Ryan M. Seidemann, The Mouse that Roared: Can Louisiana's Coastal Zone Management Consistency Authority Play a Role in Coastal Restoration and Protection?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (2006) [hereinafter Langford et al.].
2. Id. at 102-03.
3. Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991).
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Lease Sale 200

Following the devastation left in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
revisited, in late 2005, the possibility of forcing the federal government, particularly the Minerals Management Service (MMS), to
exercise greater caution and diligence when permitting oil and gas
activities off of the Louisiana coast. 4 Governor Blanco claimed
that MMS planned to continue with OCS mineral leasing activities following the storms without undertaking a meaningful analysis of those storms' impacts on Louisiana's coastal zone. 5 Under
the OCSLA, MMS is charged with managing the nation's mineral
assets on the OCS.6 This task is accomplished via leasing of large
portions of the OCS in lease sales, conducted biannually in the
Gulf of Mexico. 7 Following the lease sales, MMS is charged with
the task of permitting individual exploration and development
plans within the leased areas.8 The laws noted above require
MMS to undertake analyses of the environmental impacts of this
leasing and permitting (NEPA) and coordination and consultation
with the adjacent coastal states (CZMA and OCSLA) prior to the
activities. 9 Louisiana had contended, for some time, that MMS
was doing a less-than-complete job of measuring and mitigating
mineral impacts on its fragile coastal zone.1 0
It was on this basis that Louisiana decided to challenge
MMS's actions. The timing of Louisiana's challenge meant that
the target of the challenge would be Lease Sale 200, scheduled by
MMS to occur in August 2006 and to cover substantial portions of
the Western Gulf of Mexico (off the coast of Louisiana and Texas).
4. Press Release, Office of the Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, State of
La., Governor Blanco Sends Message to Washington About Need for OCS Revenues
(Jan. 6, 2006), http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroon&tmp=detail&articleID=1632&printer=1.
5. Id.
6. MMS, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, The News Room: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mms.gov/ooc/newweb/QandA.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2008); see
Langford et al., supra note 1, at 108-14.
7. MMS, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Offshore Minerals Management, http://
www.mms.gov/offshore (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
8. MMS, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, The News Room: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mms.gov/ooc/newweb/QandA.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
9. See generally Langford et al., supra note 1; Katherine Henry, State and Federal Interaction Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry: Partners or Adversaries?, Presentation at the 54th Mineral Law Institute at Louisiana State University (2007)
(transcript available from author).
10. See generally the comment letters discussed in Langford et al., supra note 1,
at 143-45.
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It was at this time that the Louisiana Sea Grant Legal Program's
research became the framework of the State's challenge and the
academic research now had real application.
B.

The Relevant Laws

In order to fully appreciate Louisiana's challenge to MMS, it
is important to understand the relevant authorities that formed
the basis of that challenge. Comprehensive analyses of the
CZMA, the OCSLA, and NEPA have been undertaken by several
authors in recent years 1 ' and will thus not be rehashed here.
Rather, the reader is directed to these sources for a comprehensive
review of these laws, while this source contains a brief overview of
their operative portions relevant to Louisiana's 2006 case.
1.

NEPA

NEPA requires that an environmental impact statement
(EIS) be completed for any major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 12 Offshore lease
sales are considered, by law, to be just such an action. 13 Among
other things, an EIS must include information on the environmental impacts of such an action as well as alternatives to the action. 14 "A critical part of this analysis is the development of an
'environmental baseline' and then analyzing the reasonably foreseeable direct, indirect and cumulative effects of the proposed action on that baseline."1 5 Louisiana's NEPA challenges centered on
these issues: MMS failed to adequately document the environmental impacts of Lease Sale 200; MMS did not provide viable alternatives to Lease Sale 200; and, following the altered environmental
baseline 16 caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, MMS's conclu11. See, e.g., Langford et al., supra note 1. See also Henry, supra note 9.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2006).
13. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1351 (2006).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2006).
15. Henry, supra note 9, at 5 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, .8 (2005)).
16. Although the term "environmental baseline" is used in the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) to refer to certain environmental assessments of the Outer Continental Shelf, it is not defined. 30 C.F.R. § 282.28(b) (2005). The term is defined in
the C.F.R. with respect to the Endangered Species Act (ESA):
[t]he environmental baseline includes the past and present impacts of all
Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action
area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early ... consultation,
and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous
with the consultation in process.
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sions regarding impacts were flawed because they relied on a pre17
hurricane baseline.
2.

CZMA

The CZMA requires that "[e]ach Federal agency activity
within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water
use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable
with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs." 8s Known as the "consistency provision" of the CZMA, the
above-quoted language, theoretically, gives coastal states substantial oversight and even control with respect to federal activities on
the OCS.19 Under this provision, the federal agency that proposes
such activity must examine the impacts in light of an adjacent
coastal state's coastal zone laws and enforceable policies to ensure
that those laws are not violated in the proposed action. 20 The federal agency will issue a consistency determination (CD) to the
state that is supposed to show how the proposed action is consistent with the state's coastal program. 2 1 Louisiana's CZMA claim
revolved around a disagreement with MMS regarding the consistency of Lease Sale 200 with the Louisiana Coastal Resources Program (LCRP).
3.

OCSLA

Section 19 of the OCSLA (Section 19) requires the federal government to solicit comments from the governors of the adjacent
coastal states on the size, timing, and location of a proposed lease
sale. 2 2 This comment requirement does not provide coastal gover23
nors with a veto over proposed federal activities on the OCS.
Rather, it provides a forum for the states to further voice concerns
or reservations regarding a lease sale and to receive reasoned re50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005). The use of the term "environmental baseline" in this article
is analogous to the ESA usage of the term.
17. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22, 27-28, Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813 (E.D. La. Jul. 27, 2007) [hereinafter State Memorandum].
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (2006).
19. Langford et al., supra note 1, at 108-13. Although these provisions do not
provide states with veto authority over federal OCS actions, a successful legal challenge to such federal activities will essentially result in a veto.
20. Henry, supra note 9, at 3.
21. Id.
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(a) (2006); Henry, supra note 9, at 6.
23. Henry, supra note 9, at 6-7; see also, H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 153 (1977).
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sponses from the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
(DOI) (the parent agency of MMS) as to why the agency plans to
go forward. 24 The OCSLA requires MMS/DOI to implement a governor's proposals unless they are not practicable. 25 If the proposals are not implemented, the Secretary of DOI must provide the
reasoned responses discussed above. 26 Louisiana's claims under
the OCSLA centered around Governor Blanco's recommendation
under Section 19 that MMS/DOI postpone Lease Sale 200 until
the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Louisiana's coastal
environment could be fully studied and until studies of the manner in which those impacts relate to OCS oil and gas development
could be accomplished. 2 7 MMS/DOI chose not to follow Governor
Blanco's proposal and did not provide a substantive explanation
28
for its decision.
II.

LOUISIANA'S CHALLENGE

A. What was the case about?
Louisiana's case was about environmental protectionPERIOD. It could not, under the existing law, demand monetary
damages, attorneys fees, or a greater share of OCS revenues.
The State received a considerable amount of criticism in the
press that it had instituted its action against MMS to force greater
revenue sharing from minerals derived on the OCS.29 A cursory
review of the State's filings in Blanco v. Burton clearly demonstrates the fallacy of these criticisms. The State presented numerous alleged violations by MMS of the relevant federal laws
governing the OCS process that raised significant concerns about
the protection of the State's coastal environment in a post-Ka24. Henry, supra note 9, at 6-7; H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 153 (1977).
25. Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1384 (D. Mass. 1984).
26. Henry, supra note 9, at 7.
27. See generally Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., to Renee Orr, MMS (May 30, 2006) (on file with author).
28. See Letter from Rejane M. Burton, Dir., MMS, to Kathleen Babineaux Blanco,
Governor of La., 1 (Jun. 11, 2006) (on file with author).
29. See, e.g., John A. Sullivan, Gov. Blanco Won't Seek 2nd Term; Tenure Impacted Energy Industry, NATURAL GAS WK., Mar. 26, 2007, at 1 (commenting that
"Blanco went to court to block the lease sale, unless Louisiana got more royalties from
offshore leasing"); see also, Cathy Landry, La. Asks Court to Block Lease Sale, to Pressure U.S. on Revenue Sharing, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FED. LANDS, July 24, 2006, at 10
(commenting that "[w]hile the lawsuit seeks only to prevent the lease sale until MMS
completes an environmental study on the impact of new drilling in the wake of last
year's hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the real issue behind the suit is money.").
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trina/Rita environment. 30 Thus, despite the claims of some critics
it is clear that the suit had nothing at all to do with revenue sharing. The case always was and always will be an environmental
protection case and a case about the power of a state's voice in the
31
protection of its coast.
How powerful is this voice? Can the coastal states actually
have an impact on policy decisions in Washington, D.C. when
their environments are at stake? State officials in Louisiana believed that they could get the federal government to rethink its oil
and gas policy in a way that would be more protective of the
coastal zone. One way to do this was to force the federal agency to
adhere to its own laws under the CZMA and NEPA. If the federal
government loses a challenge to OCS activities under either
NEPA or the CZMA consistency provisions, the most likely outcome would be more paperwork: a better and more comprehensive
EIS and better attempts to demonstrate and achieve consistency
with the State's coastal resources program. The hope was that
such studies would lead to more careful permitting actions off
Louisiana's coast that should ensure that activities undertaken
pursuant to such permits would be more environmentally
protective.
Louisiana is currently the nation's top domestic supplier of oil
and natural gas.3 2 Eighty percent of all of the United States' oil

and gas passes through Louisiana in some form. 33 For all of the
damage that the State's coastal environment suffers by serving as
the conduit for the nation's energy needs, very little attention is
paid to it.
Congress enacted NEPA and the consistency provisions of the
CZMA to ensure that (among other things) the states off whose
30. See generally Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2,
Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. 2006) [hereinafter State

Complaint].
31. The pressure of Louisiana's scrutiny of the true environmental impacts of the
OCS lease sales may have influenced some in Congress to vote for a revenue sharing
bill as a way of helping the state mitigate the impacts but that was not the purpose of

the lawsuit.
32. Landry, supra note 29, at 10.
33. Nick Bouterie, Offshore Revenue Bill Has Problems, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE,
July 7, 2006, at B8. It is somewhat difficult to nail down the actual percentage of oil
and gas that passes through Louisiana. Another source states that the amount is
one-fifth of all of the oil and gas that enters the nation. Anne R. Konigsmark, La.
Parish Wonders What's Next: Peninsula'sResidents Disappointed, Fearful After $1.6
Billion for Levee Upgrades Axed, USA TODAY, May 1, 2006. Some of the distinction
appears to come from whether the source is U.S. land and waters or worldwide
sources. The higher figure seems to represent the former and the lower, the latter.
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coasts OCS oil and gas development occurs have a check on the
wanton actions of the federal government. 3 4 The general idea is
that the decision makers in Washington may not be aware of the
local environmental impacts of their decisions that are made
thousands of miles away. Providing the coastal states with a voice
in coastal protection because they should know their coasts more
intimately than the federal government is the purpose behind the
35
consistency provisions.
B.

The Comment Letters

The environmental analysis for Lease Sale 200 was completed
in 2002 as part of the 2002-2007 five-year plan EIS.3 6 There was
no way for MMS to have taken account of the changed environmental baseline following the 2005 hurricane season without undertaking a new environmental analysis. Because there was so
much devastation in Louisiana's coastal zone as result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the State hoped, without really expecting
much, that MMS would take these impacts into consideration in
its EA and consistency determination for Lease Sale 200. Due to
the substantial amount of damage that occurred on offshore rigs
and onshore infrastructure, it seemed only logical that once MMS
got back on its feet from the storms, 37 it would have to take a hard
look at the future implications of this damage on Gulf coastal
environments.
34. Such was certainly the case with the 1990 amendments to the CZMA. See
Sam Kalen, The Coastal Zone Management Act of Today: Does SustainabilityHave a
Chance?, 15 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 201-03 (2006).
35. Edward A. Fitzgerald, California Coastal Commission v. Norton: A Coastal
State Victory in the Seaweed Rebellion, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155, 185 (2004)
(commenting that "State control was superior to federal authority because the coastal
states possessed the 'resources, administrative machinery, enforcement powers, and
constitutional authority on which to build sound coastal management programs.' The
coastal states already had control over coastal resources, possessed inherent zoning
authority, and were closer to regional problems than the federal government.").
36. MMS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 2003-2007: CENTRAL PLANNING
AREA SALES 185, 190, 194, 198, AND 201; WESTERN PLANNING AREA SALES 187, 192,

196, AND 200 (2002).
37. MMS in New Orleans was out of commission due to Hurricane Katrina for
some time. See, e.g., Press Release, MMS, Gulf of Mexico Region Adjudication Office
Reopens in New Orleans (Oct. 18, 2005) http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2005/
pressl019.htm (noting the reopening of certain MMS functions in New Orleans). See
also, Press Release, MMS, MMS Regional Office Operations Return to New Orleans;
Commitment to Stay in the Area (Nov. 1, 2005) http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2005/
pressll01a.htm (noting the reopening of MMS offices in New Orleans).
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MMS has a practice of, once completing an EIS, tiering each
subsequent EA and CD off of that EIS and previous EAs and CDs
until the next EIS is done. 38 Although this may be an efficient
means of creating the legally required environmental documents
for MMS, it creates a largely cut-and-paste approach to the creation of EAs and CDs that essentially reference older documents
without substantial new impacts analyses being done. The problem with this approach, demonstrated infra, is that environmental changes between EISs are given only cursory treatment in the
tiered EAs and CDs. Despite the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, MMS did not undertake a completely new environ39
mental analysis of the affected areas prior to Lease Sale 200.
Rather, MMS tiered the EA and CD for Lease Sale 200, giving
only a superficial and perfunctory mention of the damage of the
storms, 40 with no assurance that the damages to OCS facilities
would not have impacts on any facilities erected pursuant to
Lease Sale 200 or on Louisiana's coastal environment.
The State received this disappointing CD, dated March 31,
2006, and it had sixty days to respond. 4 1 The CD was woefully
inadequate in terms of ensuring consistency with Louisiana's
Coastal Use Guidelines. 4 2 Louisiana's response was voluminous
43
and comprehensive.
In a twenty-four-page letter dated June 14, 2006, Governor
Kathleen Blanco responded to what Louisiana considered to be
the major shortcomings of MMS's Lease Sale 200 CD. As an initial matter, Governor Blanco stated: "[Wie find that proposed
Lease Sale 200 is not consistent with the enforceable policies of
the Louisiana Coastal Resources Program ... [and that] the proposed federal action has the potential to adversely affect the Louisiana Coastal Zone socioeconomics, infrastructure, and wetland
38. Henry, supra note 9, at 6.
39. The affected areas from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita effectively blanketed
the entire Western Planning Area. See MMS, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Gulf of Mexico Leasing Maps & Official Protraction Diagrams (2007), http://www.gomr.mms.gov/
homepg/lsesale/opd2.pdf (showing the Western Planning Area (denoted WGM) as
spanning the Texas coast, with much of the operations extending off the Texas and
Louisiana coasts-directly in the line of fire for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
40. See Henry, supra note 9, at 7-9.
41. Letter from Rejane M. Burton, Dir., MMS, to Scott A. Angelle, Sec'y, La. Dep't
of Natural Res. (Mar. 27, 2006) (on file with author).
42. See generally Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., to Renee Orr, MMS 1 (June 14, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter June 2006 Letter
from Governor Blanco to Ms. Orr].
43. Id.
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resources to an unacceptable degree."4 4 This clear statement that
the State was unconvinced that MMS had undertaken a meaningful environmental analysis or made reasonable attempts to mitigate OCS-related impacts should have been sufficient to put MMS
on notice that Louisiana was now serious about protecting its
coast. 45 It is also important to note that the concerns voiced by
the State were not limited to MMS's failure to account for hurricane impacts. In this vein, Governor Blanco stated, "As the State
has argued for years, the costs and damages incurred by the State,
in its role as the primary supporter of the infrastructure necessary
for the mineral development of the OCS, are greatly disproportionate to the benefits received by the State."4 6 This statement is
important as it set the stage for the State to challenge not only
MMS's failure to critically evaluate the impacts from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, but also its repeated ignorance of the cumulative and indirect impacts to Louisiana's coastal zone that result
from OCS activity.
Following opening statements on the inadequate analyses
and nonchalance generally exhibited by MMS towards Louisiana's
coastal concerns, Governor Blanco instituted a point-for-point refuting of the unfounded claims of the federal government. One of
the major problems with the CD, according to Governor Blanco,
was the lack of "comprehensive data and information sufficient to
47
support MMS's determination" of consistency with the LCRP.
An oft-repeated refrain emerges from this letter: Governor Blanco
notes that MMS "erroneously assumes that it is still appropriate
after these catastrophic storm events, for MMS to essentially rely
on and repeat older CDs." 48 This failure to critically evaluate
changed circumstances and to continue the practice of tiering,
when simple logic would dictate otherwise, appears in several of
the State's comment letters as well as the Judge's opinion, infra
Part III. The Governor goes on to recount the numerous Coastal
Use Guidelines that MMS failed to consider in the Lease Sale 200
44. Id. at 1.
45. Since the inception of its coastal zone management program Louisiana had
expressed concerns about the environmental impacts from OCS leasing but, with one
exception, had never attempted to challenge an OCS consistency determination. See,
e.g., Letter from Terry Howey, Adm'r, CMD, Dep't Natural Res., to Chris C. Oynes,
MMS (Aug. 3, 1994) (on file with author); Letter from Ron Gomez, Secretary, Dep't
Natural Res., to Thomas A. Readinger, MMS (May 14, 1991); LOUISIANA DEP'T OF
NATURAL RES., INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT: LEASE SALE #135 12 (July 29, 1991).
46. June 2006 Letter from Governor Blanco to Ms. Orr, supra, note 42, at 1.

47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
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CD, including required information on soil and water conditions;
flood and storm hazards; 49 the techniques and materials used in
the construction, operation, and maintenance of the OCS infrastructure and facilities; 50 drainage patterns; 5 1 alternatives to proceeding with Lease Sale 200;52 economic impacts; 5 3 impacts on
traditional land uses, fisheries, and tourism; 5 4 impacts on natural
features and wildlife; 55 cumulative and indirect impacts; 56 local
government strain; 57 alteration of wetlands and other sensitive
60
areas; 58 disruption of social patterns; 59 archaeological impacts;
among several others.
The sum total of the concerns expressed in Governor Blanco's
letter is broad and substantial. Governor Blanco did not state
that the lease sale should not go forward. Rather, she stated that,
before the lease sale was to occur, substantially more environmental work needed to be done to ensure the protection of Louisiana's
coastal zone.
MMS's response was dismissive, calling the utility of the con6 1 MMS
sistency provisions of the CZMA into substantial doubt.
summarily dismissed the State's concerns, without explanation,
pejoratively implying that the State did not know what it was
talking about and that MMS's consistency determination was correct the first time around. 62 Despite this comprehensive examina49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. Id. at 7-8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 9-10.
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id. at 11-13.
58. Id. at 13-15.
59. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 16-19.
61. Letter from Rejane M. Burton, Dir., MMS, to Kathleen Babineaux Blanco,
Governor of La. (June 30, 2006).
62. In response to the voluminous CD objection letter from Governor Blanco,
MMS responded with a letter that stated:
We have thoroughly evaluated all applicable guidelines of the Louisiana
Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 and the activities resulting
from proposed Sale 200.... [W]e believe that proposed Sale 200 activities
will be consistent with the provisions identified as enforceable by Louisiana in the Louisiana Coastal Resources Program.... While we acknowledge that the State of Louisiana believes that potential Sale 200 activities
will not be fully consistent with those subject provisions, we believe that
proposed Sale 200 activities will be consistent with the LCRP. We will be
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tion of MMS's shortcomings with respect to the Lease Sale 200
CD, a letter from Director Burton, dated July 11, 2006, made it
clear that MMS had no intention to stop Lease Sale 200.63 Their
reasoning was economic, citing the injury that the oil and gas industry would suffer should Lease Sale 200 be postponed to allow
for sufficient environmental study. 6 4 No consideration of Louisiana's concerns in any of its comment letters was made by Director
Burton. On July 13, 2006, MMS posted its Final Notice of Sale
without making any change to its environmental analyses to ad65
dress Louisiana's concerns.
The State also submitted comments on the Lease Sale 200 EA
6
and MMS's Finding of No New Significant Impact (FONNSI), 6
which were due on May 18, 2006.67 Once again, MMS dismissed
68
the State's concerns.
The State noted, in a nineteen-page letter to MMS, that one of
the major problems with the CD and EA, was MMS's failure to
critically evaluate the impacts of OCS activity in light of the devastation of the 2005 hurricane season. 69 Despite this and other
shortcomings, the State began its comments on the EA and
FONNSI, as it has done many times in the past, by noting its general support for OCS oil and gas development. 70 In addition to the
State's concerns that MMS had not taken the requisite "hard look"
at the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to coastal
Louisiana and the future of OCS activity off its shores, Louisiana
challenged MMS's practice of "tiering" its environmental analyses
71
off of previous work.
proceeding with the remainder of the planning process for the proposed
Sale 200 as scheduled.
Id. No critical analysis of Louisiana's concerns is apparent in this one-page letter.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Final Notice of Sale, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,538 (July 17, 2006). The original
notice, disseminated via MMS's website on July 13, 2006, is available at http:/l
www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/lsesale/200/fcov200.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
66. MMS, PROPOSED OCS LEASE SALE 200, WESTERN GULF OF MExIco - ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (OCS EIS/EA MMS 2006-016).
67. See generally Letter from Gerald Duszynski, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Coastal
Mgmt. Div., La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Chris Oynes, MMS (May 17, 2006) (on file
with author).
68. See generally Letter from Chris C. Oynes, Reg'l Dir., MMS, to Gerald M. Duszynski, La. Dep't of Natural Res. (June 14, 2006) (on file with author).
69. See Letter from Gerald Duszynski, Acting Assistant Sec'y, La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Chris Oynes, MMS 2-7 (May 17, 2006) (on file with author).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 17.
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The practice of "tiering" essentially means that MMS creates
one periodic EIS (usually the multi-sale EIS) and then merely rehashes and incorporates the findings of that study to all lease sale
environmental documents produced for the following several
years. 7 2 The practical result of this approach, as opposed to conducting complete environmental analyses from the ground up for
each federal action, is that a cut-and-paste approach is created,
whereby assumptions that are years-old are relied upon. Very little, if any, new information or data are analyzed, and each purportedly new environmental document essentially parrots the
previous ones, regardless of changed circumstances. Such an approach, as occurred with Lease Sale 200, can easily overlook storm
impacts as well as cumulative and indirect impacts.
The State informed MMS, in the EA letter, that this approach
73
is an unacceptable means of analyzing environmental impacts.
The State also belabored the inadequacy of MMS's treatment of
cumulative and indirect impacts. 7 4 Ultimately, the State, in noting that the issuance of the EA and FONNSI and MMS's plan to
proceed with the proposed action were premature, stated that
"[1]ast year's hurricane season has given us both a tragic understanding of poor planning and an unprecedented opportunity to
rectify the past decisions that have contributed to the situation in
which the State now finds itself."75 The State then made a strong
case, based on MMS's inadequate EA and ongoing studies of the
impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on both Louisiana's coast
and the future of OCS activity, that MMS should postpone Lease
Sale 200 until more and better environmental information was
76
available.
Despite the reality that MMS's tiering and rush to conduct
Lease Sale 200 caused them to overlook both the devastation
wrought on Louisiana's coast by the 2005 storms and the implications of OCS activity on Louisiana's altered environmental baseline, MMS maintained, in a response to Louisiana's comments on
the EA and FONNSI, that "we have made a concerted and thorough effort to update all significant information that has changed
72. See Henry, supra note 9, at 6; see also, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2007).
73. Letter from Gerald Duszynski, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Coastal Mgmt. Div.,
La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Chris Oynes, MMS 4-7 (May 17, 2006) (on file with
author).
74. Id. at 7-10.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 10-17.
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since the original multisale EIS and previous EA's [sic]."77 Apparently this thorough effort did not pick up the Katrina and Rita
impacts.
In response to Louisiana's finding that the FONNSI was invalid, MMS noted that substantial new evidence had been added to
the EA following the storms. MMS then launched into a discussion of the fact that, despite the tragic nature of the 2005 storms,
"these natural disasters occur independently of impacts related to
OCS lease sales, despite the change in baseline conditions .... "78
MMS apparently treats OCS impacts as though they occur in a
vacuum and are not affected by "trivial" matters such as hurricanes that destroy 217 square miles of Louisiana wetlands. 79 The
remainder of MMS's response is equally nonsensical, but did evidence an intent to proceed with Lease Sale 200 despite Louisiana's pleas for reconsideration.
MMS also commented on Louisiana's failure to critically object to OCS activities in the past.8 0 Although this should not be a
consideration in the CZMA/NEPA process, 8 ' MMS tried to cast
doubt on the sincerity of the State's concerns through this statement. This fact and the statement would haunt the State for the
remainder of the comment process and throughout the litigation.
The State had to take great pains to point out that: (1) a state can
change its position on OCS development; and (2) although the
State had only objected once before to a lease sale, it had, for
years, noted its concern regarding cumulative and indirect impacts of OCS activity that it believed that MMS should address in
82
its environmental analyses.
Using her authority under Section 19 of the OCSLA, in a letter dated May 30, 2006, Governor Blanco commented on the "size,
timing, or location"8 3 of proposed Lease Sale 200.84 Once again,
Governor Blanco reiterated the State's support for OCS oil and
77. Letter from Chris C. Oynes, Reg'l Dir., MMS, to Gerald M. Duszynski, Acting
Assistant Sec'y, La. Dep't of Natural Res. 1 (Jun. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
78. Id. at 1-2.
79. See JOHN A. BARRAs, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN-FILE REPORT 06-1274,
LAND AREA CHANGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA AFTER THE 2005 HURRICANES: A SERIES OF
THREE MAPS, (2006), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2006/1274/.

80. Letter from Chris C. Oynes, Reg'l Dir., MMS, to Gerald M. Duszynski, Acting
Assistant Sec'y, La. Dep't of Natural Res., supra note 77, at 1.
81. See Langford et al., supra note 1, at 128-35.
82. See, e.g., Letter from Charles G. Groat, La. Geological Survey, to John L.
Rankin, MMS (Oct. 8, 1982) (on file with author); Letter from David Treen, Governor
of La., to William C. Clark, Sec'y of the Interior (Feb. 8, 1984) (on file with author).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2007).
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gas development.8 5 However, Governor Blanco also stated that
"[t]he State... has determined that the timing of proposed Lease
86
Sale 200 is inappropriate."
Governor Blanco's concerns in her Section 19 letter were
solely related to the timing of Lease Sale 200 with respect to the
unstudied impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Louisiana's
coastal zone.8 7 The Governor compared the lack of information
that led to the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill to MMS's plan of action with Lease Sale 200.88 She noted that "[t]he devastating effects of the Santa Barbara spill are precisely what the State of
Louisiana is now afraid of should OCS activity continue, unchecked, in the wake of the hurricane damage to the State's topog89
raphy and industrial infrastructure."
Citing these fears and MMS reports that placed substantial
numbers of pipelines and platforms in the direct path of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Governor Blanco recommended that
Lease Sale 200 "be postponed and, instead, included in the next
five-year leasing program."90 The hope was that such a delay
would allow time for necessary impacts analyses to be completed
and that a clearer picture of Louisiana's post-Katrina/Rita coastal
zone would emerge, allowing for more informed decision-making.
MMS dismissed the State's concerns without much explanation. 9 1
C.

The Lawsuit

On July 20, 2006, Governor Blanco and the State of Louisiana
filed their Complaint against Director Burton, MMS, and the Department of the Interior (DOI) in the Eastern District of Louisiana. 9 2 The Complaint was filed for alleged violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 93 NEPA, 9 4 the CZMA, 95
84. Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., to Renee Orr, MMS
(May 30, 2006) (on file with author).
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Letter from Rejane M. Burton, Dir., MMS, to Kathleen Babineaux Blanco,
Governor of La. (July 11, 2006) (on file with author).
92. See State Complaint, supra note 30.
93. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2007).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2007).
95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2007).
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and the OCSLA. 96 The Complaint was followed, on July 25, 2006,
by the State's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and an accompanying memorandum. 9 7 Basically, in these filings, the State alleged that MMS's EA, FONNSI, CD and its notice of decision to
hold Lease Sale 200 were "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with NEPA, the CZMA, or
the OCSLA."9 8
Following a lengthy discussion of the history of NEPA, the
CZMA, and the OCSLA, as well as Louisiana's oil and gas history
and the history of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the State asserted four claims for relief against MMS in the Complaint. 9 9 The
first count contained MMS's alleged violations of NEPA.' 0 0 The
State alleged that, because MMS must evaluate the impacts of
Lease Sale 200 through a post-Katrina/Rita lens and because no
revised environmental baseline following the storms was used,
MMS's failure to prepare a supplemental EIS or an adequate EA
was a violation of NEPA and the attendant Council on Environmental Quality regulations.1 0 ' More pointedly, the State claimed
that "[d]efendants, therefore, failed to take the requisite 'hard
look' at the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the OCS oil
and gas development and exploration activities that would be authorized under proposed Lease Sale 200, on Louisiana and its
coastal resources and communities." 10 2 Further, the State alleged
that "[d]efendants' preparation of the EA, their decision to issue
the FONNSI, and their decision to hold proposed Lease Sale 200,
as proposed, are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,
and not in accordance with NEPA and its governing
0 3
regulations."
The second count related to the State's position that MMS
had not provided adequate data to make a consistency determination under the CZMA.1o 4 As noted above and as discussed at
length in Part II B, 10 5 supra, MMS must provide adequate data to
support its conclusion that any OCS activity is consistent with the
96. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356(a) (2007).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

State Memorandum, supra note 17.
See generally State Memorandum, supra note 17, at 22-63.
See State Complaint, supra note 30, at 29-37.
Id. 93-102.
Id. 101; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(iii) (2007).
State Complaint, supra note 30, $1101.
Id.
102. See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
See State Complaint, supra note 30,
103-109.
See, e.g., Langford et al., supra note 1.
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LCRP. 10 6 The State contended, in Count II, that such information
was lacking and that the failure of MMS to supplement the record
with more and better data, following repeated requests, was unacceptable and insufficient.1 0 7 Accordingly, the State contended
that MMS's failures in this regard and their consistency determination in the absence of such data represented an arbitrary and
08
capricious decision under the APA.
Count III was largely related to Count II, containing allegations that MMS's consistency determination was arbitrary and capricious. In this count, the State contended that MMS's failure to
consider most of the State's 94 Coastal Use Guidelines represented a failure to comply with the requirements, under 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c), to ensure that "federal activities be consistent to the
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of a
State's coastal management program."1 0 9
In Count IV, the State alleged that the Secretary of the Interior derogated his duty under the OCSLA 1" 0 by not adequately responding to Governor Blanco's comments in her Section 19 letter
of May 30, 2006. The basis of this count was the State's contention that "Governor Blanco's recommendations provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being
of the citizens of the State of Louisiana." 1' 1 The perceived arbitrariness and capriciousness on this matter was that, under 43
U.S.C. § 1345(c) and 30 C.F.R. § 256.31(b) (the OCSLA), the Secretary of the Interior must "accept the Governor's recommendations, 'if he determines, after having provided the opportunity for
consultation, that they provide for a reasonable balance between
the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State.'11 2 Because Louisiana contended that Governor
Blanco's recommendations were consonant with the balance of interests in the OCSLA, the Secretary's failure to adopt them was
arbitrary and capricious.
In its request for relief, the State requested a declaration that
MMS had violated the OCSLA, CZMA, and NEPA.1 1 3 The State
further requested that MMS be enjoined from proceeding with
106. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(a) (2007).
107. See State Complaint, supra note 30,

107.

108. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See State Complaint, supra note 30, T 111.
43 U.S.C. §1456(c) (2006); 30 C.F.R. § 256.31(b)-(c) (2007).
See State Complaint, supra note 30, T 123.
Id. 1 120.
State Complaint, supra note 30.
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Lease Sale 200 and that the defendants be issued a writ of mandamus to prevent them from continuing to act in the manner that
the State alleged was violative of the OCSLA, CZMA, NEPA, and
114
the APA.
The bulk of the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction provided support for the claims made
in the Complaint. 1 15 New information provided to the court in the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum related to the irreparable harm necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 116 In this portion of the Memorandum, the State focused on the indirect and
cumulative impacts 117 that flow from the conduct of one lease sale.
The State relied heavily, in its discussion of these impacts, on the
testimony of experts and local leaders submitted into the record
by way of affidavits. The State argued that the cumulative and
indirect impacts of OCS lease sales caused substantial irreparable
and irreversible harm to Louisiana's coast through exacerbated
wetlands loss and degradation, habitat destruction, tourism
problems, archaeological site destruction, and socioeconomic
problems. 1 1 8 The State used the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as examples of a worst-case scenario
should such coastal abuse be permitted to continue unabated and
unchecked. 1 9 Taken together, the State argued that these harms

114. Id.
115. See State Memorandum, supra note 17, at 20-63.
116. Id. at 63-73.
117. Cumulative impacts are an important concept in environmental protection
and coastal zone management. See, e.g., Kyle B. Beall, A Study of Environmental
Politics:The Sandy IslandFiasco, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 17, 41 (1997) (noting the concern
of South Carolina officials with regard to potential cumulative impacts resulting from
development plans on a coastal site in 1993). Small but continuing impacts amount to
death by a thousand cuts, but it is difficult from a policy and political standpoint to
disallow actions that, by themselves, have only small effect. See Kalen, supra note 34,
at 208; Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's CoastalZone,
47 MD. L. REV. 358, 364 (1988). No one wants to accept responsibility for being a part
of a larger problem and will feel put upon if their actions are prohibited or regulated.
There are numerous examples, however, of how these small impacts have had a devastating cumulative effect. One need only look at the oil and gas canals that have
sliced up large portions of Louisiana's coastal wetlands one small piece at a time for
proof of this phenomenon. LOUISIANA GEOLOGICAL SuRvEy & U.S. EPA, SAVING LouISIANA'S COASTAL WETLANDS: A NEED FOR A LONG-TERM PLAN OF ACTION 10 (Apr. 1987)
(noting the destructive nature of individual oil and gas canals in Louisiana's coastal
wetlands).
118. State Memorandum, supra note 17, at 63-73.
119. See generally id. passim.
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clearly represented the irreparable harm necessary to support the
120
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on August 3, 2006.121
As with the Plaintiffs' filings, a substantial portion of the Defendants' Memorandum (approximately 20 pages) was devoted to a review of the applicable law. This review, in the interest of brevity,
will not be examined here. Instead, we will focus on the Defendants' defenses to the State's claims.
One of the major contentions of the Defendants was that the
State had failed to make a case for the irreparable harm required
to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction. "Plaintiffs
cannot be harmed by the holding of Lease Sale 200. Any harm
they might suffer is speculative and could arise only in the far
future."1 2 2 The Defendants argued that because the State's primary concerns related to cumulative and indirect impacts, and because such impacts were long-term and would not begin to occur
until the exploration and development phase of the OCS process,
23
this did not rise to the level of immediate irreparable harm.
The point that the lease sale phase is merely an opening of
bids and the awarding of leases was much belabored by the Defendants. 2 4 They argued that, because any actual activity on the
leases would be subject to subsequent, project specific environmental reviews, the State had "conflate[d] the federal action challenged" by complaining of potential impacts that would stem from
the exploration and development phase rather than the lease sale
5
itself.12
Of the State's concerns regarding potential wetlands impacts,
the Defendants claimed that such concerns "simply lack[]
merit."1 26 "Plaintiffs' suggestion that the August 16, 2006, Lease
Sale will have 'irreversible effects on Louisiana's wetlands' such
that injunctive relief is immediately warranted strains credulity."1 2 7 The Defendants also claimed that Lease Sale 200 would
120. Id. at 63-73.
121. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum].
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 20.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 23 n.6.
127. Id. at 24.
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have no impacts on infrastructure, recreation, tourism, commer128
cial interests, archaeology, or historic properties.
The Defendants devoted a substantial amount of their Memorandum to reminding the court of the deference that they are entitled to as a federal agency. One example of this defense is the
following statement: "Plaintiffs' suggestion that MMS cannot be
trusted to adhere to its duties when conducting later analyses
under OCSLA should be rejected by the Court.' 2 9
The "public interest" also consumed a substantial amount of
the Defendants' Memorandum. The Defendants cited congressional documents in support of their position that, although environmental concerns should be taken into account when conducting
any phase of the OCS process, such concerns are subservient to
the "public interest."' 30 This public interest, according to the de3
fendants, is the maximization of mineral resources on the OCS.' '
In support of the burden to the public interest, should the State's
position be accepted, the Defendants noted the current energy
13 2
needs that would be affected if Lease Sale 200 were enjoined.
"[Any delay of this sale imposes significant and unnecessary economic and national defense costs on the United States and the
public."' 33 "I]f the Lease Sale is cancelled or delayed, losses to
the U.S. Treasury could top $285 million."' 3 4
In defense of the environmental documents prepared for
Lease Sale 200, the Defendants commented that they had analyzed new information, "with particular emphasis on the impacts
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita." 35 Additionally, apparently
based on this new information, the Defendants asserted that "the
EA appropriately identified the changes to the 'environmental
baseline' with respect to wetlands." 136 Further defenses of the
EA's assessments of social and infrastructural impacts are also in13 7
cluded in the Memorandum.
The Defendants made much of the burden that would be
placed on decision making should they be required to "supplement
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 24-25.
at 23.
at 27-30.

at 29.
(citations omitted).
at 31.
at 33.
at 38-42.
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an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is
finalized." 138 This theme became a substantial issue in the judgment, infra Part III.
Another of the most discussed issues in the Defendants' Memorandum was along the lines of Louisiana's history in past OCS
13 9
concurrences and the State's past oil and gas leasing history.
This issue is illustrated by the following quotations:
* Considering Louisiana's past practice of concurring on similar CDs, its continuing approval of oil and gas activities in
state and federal waters, and MMS' extensive review of the
potential environmental harms as set forth in the CDs, EIS,
and EAs, MMS' consistency determination was a reasonable
140
one and cannot be viewed as arbitrary and capricious.
* [T]he State continues to conduct lease sales for oil and gas
activities in its own waters .... Assuredly the State would
not go forward with leasing of state submerged lands for oil
and gas activities unless those activities were consistent
14 1
with its LCRP policies.
The Defendants concluded their rebuttal to the State's claims
with a justification of their actions with respect to Section 19 of
the OCSLA. 142 The Defendants claimed that the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior ("the Secretary") had fully complied
with his duties under Section 19 by reviewing the Governor's recommendations. He was not obligated to accept them and he rejected them following a balancing of the State's concerns against
the national interest. 14 3 The Defendants concluded their Memorandum with a request that the State's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction be denied.
On August 2, 2006, the American Petroleum Institute (API)
filed an intervention as a defendant in Blanco v. Burton in order
to ensure that the oil and gas industry's interests were protected.14 4 This reason for intervening was made clear by the API:
"API is aware that that [sic] Defendants will oppose Plaintiffs' re138. Id. at 42 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373
(1989)).
139. Id. at 50-53.
140. Id. at 49.
141. Id. at 57.
142. Id. at 61-65.
143. Id.
144. Intervenor's Motion and Incorporated Memorandum for Expedited Hearing
6, Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. 2006).
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quest for a preliminary injunction. But one of the reasons for allowing API to intervene is that the federal government's interests
are not identical to those of the industry."'145 The API's challenge
to Louisiana's attempt to block Lease Sale 200 on environmental
grounds was purely an economic argument. Their filings focused
solely on an alleged irreparable injury to the oil and gas industry
should the State prevail in its efforts to "delay, and ultimately
cancel . . . the lease sale of blocks to be offered in OCS Sale No.
200."146

In support of its position, the API noted the potential loss to
industry of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent thus far in
evaluating tracts on which to bid. Additional hardships noted by
the API included such things as industry being required to expend
additional funds to maintain bonuses in the event of a delay and
the expense of keeping technical teams on standby to continue to
evaluate bid statuses. 147 The API claimed that "[d]elay would also
disrupt the ability of API member companies to obtain badly
needed petroleum supplies for our country."1 48 In addition, the
API was concerned that competitors would gain some measure of
unfair insight into bidding companies' plans should the bids be
opened but then the sale ultimately be cancelled. 14 9 On these bases, the API pleaded for admission to the lawsuit as a party-defendant. The parties consented to the API's admission to the lawsuit
as an intervenor-defendant without a hearing.
In its Memorandum of the American Petroleum Institute in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the
API largely echoed the issues raised by the Defendants. The API
claimed that the threat of immediate harm was not demonstrated
by the State, and indeed that it did not exist. 15 0 Additionally, the
API argued that the Lease Sale stage of the process was the inappropriate stage at which to challenge environmental impacts, as
no impacts flowed from the mere sale of leases.' 5 ' The API
145. Id.
146. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene as a Defendant at
2, Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046.
147. See generally Memorandum of the American Petroleum Institute in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046
[hereinafter API's Memorandum].
148. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene as a Defendant at
6, Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046.
149. Id. at 6-7.
150. API's Memorandum, supra note 147, at *4-*10.
151. Id. at *5-*8.
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summed up their substantive challenge to the State's claims with
a review of the alleged economic impacts that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would have on the oil and gas industry and
a review of how the stopping of Lease Sale 200 would damage the
public interest. 15 2 Overall, despite the claims of the API that it
would bring unique interests to the case through its intervention,
its claims were, for the most part, identical to those of the
Defendants.
III. JUDGE ENGELHARDT'S OPINION
The matter was assigned to Judge Kurt Engelhardt, a recent
appointee to the federal bench. Recognizing the urgency of the
State's concerns, the judge set a hearing on the preliminary injunction for three weeks from the filing of the lawsuit. He also
promised to have a decision in the matter before the scheduled
lease sale on August 16, 2006.
Following oral argument in which the State pointed out such
things as MMS's failure to address most of the State's Coastal Use
Guidelines, MMS's insistence that it had complied with the law,
and the API's recap of the industry's economic concerns, Judge
Engelhardt took the matter under advisement. He issued his decision on the preliminary injunction on August 14, two days before
the scheduled lease sale was to occur: "Plaintiffs' Motion for Pre15 3
liminary Injunction is DENIED."
The judge's sole reason for denying the State's request for a
preliminary injunction to stop Lease Sale 200 was that, in his
opinion, any actions taken by MMS under the actual Lease Sale
would not cause immediate irreparable harm to the State before a
full trial on the merits could be had.154 Essentially, the judge did
not feel that the actual granting of the leases led to the complained-of environmental impacts, but rather that it was the subsequent activity that did. 155 Despite the fact that the State had
argued that the cumulative impacts that flow from a single lease
sale, which represents the beginning of a largely unstoppable process, the judge apparently did not feel that the State met the high
burden for a preliminary injunction. Also important to his decision was the fact that he set a trial date for the permanent injunc152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *10-*14.
Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *1 (E.D. La. 2006).
Id.
See id.
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tion a mere three months from the date of the Lease Sale. 156 He
did not feel that the complained-of impacts would occur pursuant
to Lease Sale 200 by the time he made an ultimate decision on the

matter. 157
The one line denial of the State's request in the forty-fourpage opinion of the court was almost the only nod given to MMS
by the judge. The remainder of the opinion was a scathing assessment of the poor practices and attitude of MMS, and it included
the judge's assessment that the State would "have substantial
158
likelihood of success on the merits."
Regarding MMS's EA for Lease Sale 200, the judge stated,
"[T]he EA fails to recognize certain fundamental changes in the
devastated coastline of Louisiana. Clearly, the earlier multi-sale
EIS was rendered inadequate in some respects, irrelevant in
others, by the well-documented catastrophic effects of the 2005
hurricanes." 15 9 Although the judge noted that MMS did acknowledge that the impacts of the storms were significant, even citing
specific instances of destruction, even he seemed confused by the
agency's dismissal of these effects without analysis. 160 To this
end, he noted that:
with little or no analysis as to why, MMS concludes virtually
every discussion of changes caused by the hurricanes with a
generalized statement that its prior conclusions as to the impacts of OCS activities in connection with Lease Sale 200 remain unchanged. Abbreviated summaries and unsupported
conclusions do not suffice for insightful and well-reasoned analysis of potential significant impacts as the result of changed
circumstances.161

He also noted that all previous assumptions upon which the
earlier analyses were based "were, for the most part, blown away
in the winds and waters of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita."16 2
Judge Engelhardt also made much of what appeared to be MMS's
preordained decision to go forward with Lease Sale 200 in the face
of the mounting scientific evidence that suggested another ap156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 2.

159. Id. at 9.
160. Id.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
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proach was warranted. 163 In this vein, the judge commented on
this cavalier attitude: "rather than a well-researched analytical
approach to post-Katrina/Rita Louisiana, MMS and DOI have instead hastily provided expedient language designed to facilitate
6
its preexisting decision."1 4
As to the State's claims under the CZMA, the judge found that
the CD failed to "take into account the increased environmental
and economic risks to Louisiana's OCS supporting infrastructure
and sensitive coastal resources." 165 Once again, this time in the
CZMA discussion, the judge noted that, based upon the appearance of the CD, "the occurring of the Lease Sale was fore-ordained. '1 66 He also noted that MMS failed to follow its own
regulations when preparing the CD by not evaluating all of Louisiana's relevant enforceable Coastal Use Guidelines and other authorities. 167 This he found to be arbitrary and capricious.1 68 He
1' 69
also found the CD to contain "flawed analyses.
As to the State's OCSLA claims, the judge similarly found
MMS's activities to fall below reasonable standards. 170 He noted
that MMS's response to Governor Blanco's Section 19 letter "contains a rather casual dismissal of the Governor's recommendations by simply claiming that delay in leasing for even one sale
will cause a discernable impact on new natural gas supplies being
delivered."' 7 ' More interestingly, the judge noted that:
the distinct impression created is that, no matter what recommendations the Governor submitted, they would be disregarded
in favor of maintaining the Lease Sale schedule. In other words,
the response letter could be used to override virtually any recommendations of any governor at any time, in order to proceed
72
as the DOI secretary desires.1
In later general discussions, the judge also chastised both
MMS and API for suggesting that environmental analyses are un163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 10-11.
at 10.
at 11.
at 12.

at 13-14.
at 14.

172. Id.
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important at the lease sale stage of the OCS process. 1 73 One example of this language is the judge's statement that MMS's and
API's argument that NEPA, the CZMA, and the OCSLA compliance at the lease sale stage was unnecessary or that these laws
were "merely a 'speed bump' on the road to a predetermined destination" is particularly telling of his seeming contempt for the Defendants' cavalier attitude towards federal laws. 174 The State's
claims were further bolstered when the judge, in an almost denigrating tone, chided MMS with his comment that "compliance
75
with federal law can be a costly and bothersome proposition."
In concluding his scathing review of MMS's activities leading
to Lease Sale 200, the judge warned anyone who would bid on
Lease Sale 200 to do so "with such knowledge, that, in the opinion
of the undersigned, Defendants' compliance with the NEPA, the
CZMA, and the OCSLA is questionable at best, and that plaintiffs
have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits." 7 6 He
also warned prospective bidders to enter their bids under the doctrine of caveat emptor, as he expected that Lease Sale 200 would
77
be permanently enjoined following the November trial.
IV.

THE STATE SETTLES

Lease Sale 200 went forward as planned on August 16, 2006.
It netted record-setting profits for the federal government despite
78
the warnings of Judge Engelhardt.
Following the lease sale, pursuant to Judge Engelhardt's orders, the parties entered into settlement negotiations that lasted
from late August until mid-October. Presumably as a result of
Judge Engelhardt's strong language in his opinion, MMS came to
the table with substantial concessions. On October 24, 2006, the
parties reached a settlement on terms very favorable to the State
of Louisiana, eliminating the need for the November trial. 179 The
terms of the settlement represented a larger win for the State
than it could have gotten had it prevailed at trial.
The salient points of the settlement are as follows:
173. Id. at 17-20.
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id. at 20.
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id.
178. Press Release, MMS, Western Gulf of Mexico Sale Attracts $462.8 Million in
Bids (Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.mms.gov/ooclpress/20O6/pressO816.htm).
179. Settlement Agreement, Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 23666046
(E.D. La. 2006).
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(1) no further OCS lease sales will be conducted in the Central or Western Gulf until MMS completes a new EIS that incorporates analyses of the 2005 hurricane impacts and the cumulative
impacts of past lease sales; 80
(2) the next CD submitted to the State will not tier off of previous documents; 18 '
(3) any exploration plan submitted to the State before the
completion of the EIS must be accompanied by an EA which will
82
not be subject to a categorical exclusion (CE);'
(4) any response to a Section 19 letter from the Governor on
the next lease sale will come from the Office of the Secretary of
DOI and not a low-level representative; 8 3 and
(5) the court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement terms
84
to ensure MMS's compliance.'
Although Lease Sale 200 was not cancelled, the State was
able to retain substantial oversight of any activities undertaken
pursuant to that sale. In addition, Lease Sale 201, originally set
for March of 2007, was cancelled.' 8 5 This is beyond the scope of
8 6
what the State could have gotten at trial.
Under Part (1) of the settlement terms, the State succeeded in
putting a halt to OCS activities until MMS completed a new EIS.
The subject of Louisiana's lawsuit was only stopping Lease Sale
200. The settlement put a stop to all lease sales following Lease
Sale 200 until an EIS was completed that incorporated analyses of
the 2005 hurricane impacts and the cumulative impacts of past
lease sales. Although MMS had an EIS in the works at the time of
180. Id. at 3.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4. The term "categorical exclusion," in a NEPA context, is defined as:
a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment and which have been found
to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations ... and for which, therefore, neither an
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is
required.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007).
183. Id. at 4-5.
184. Id. at 6.
185. Lease Sale 201 was cancelled because MMS could not complete the agreedupon studies in time for the March date.
186. The settlement went beyond the scope of the lawsuit's focus-Lease Sale
200-and resulted in the cancellation of Lease Sale 201. Because Lease Sale 201 was
not a part of the State's suit, had the settlement terms been different, a separate suit
would have been necessary to affect that sale.
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settlement,1 8 7 there was no way to incorporate the settlement requirements and get it to final form in time to hold the next scheduled lease sale. Thus, Lease Sale 201, originally scheduled for
March 2007, was cancelled.1 88 The acreage was included in the
proposed Lease Sales 204 and 205, scheduled for August 2007 and
18 9
March 2008, respectively.
Part (2) of the settlement was aimed at eliminating the cutand-paste nature of MMS's environmental documents. MMS/DOI
agreed not to tier off of earlier documents in preparing the next
CD (which would be for Lease Sale 204 because Lease Sale 201
was cancelled). The idea behind this settlement term was that
forcing MMS to make a completely new document would force a
more meaningful examination of the LCRP and impacts to the
coastal zone. The outcome of these hopes is discussed infra.
Part (3) of the settlement was a compromise between the
State and MMS on Lease Sale 200. Because MMS would not rescind Lease Sale 200, which had already occurred by the time of
settlement, the State secured a promise that no exploration and
development activity would occur on acreage let under Lease Sale
200 without the completion of an EA for that activity. This essentially put a halt to the exploration and development of the Lease
Sale 200 acreage until the EIS was completed, effectively shutting
down Lease Sale 200 as well. Additionally, knowing that most exploration and development activities are afforded CEs under
NEPA,' 90 in order to ensure State oversight over these activities,
the EAs would be submitted to the Coastal Management Division
of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources for consistency
review. Although this was an important part of the settlement, no
such activity occurred before the finalizing of the new EIS. Thus,
this portion of the settlement was not tested.
Part (4) of the settlement was intended to require DOI to
show low-level officials at MMS were not dismissing the State's
concerns without meaningful examination of the State's concerns
187. See MMS, OUTER CONTINENTAL OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM: 2007-2012,
DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2006) (the completion date of this DEIS
was July of 2006, meaning that the new five-year program was well under way in the
planning stages even when Louisiana filed its lawsuit in July of 2006).
188. John A. Sullivan, MMS Cancels PlannedGulf Lease Sale, Begins Environmental Study, NATURAL GAS WK., Nov. 27, 2006, at 3.
189. Id.
190. See League for Coastal Protection v. Kempthorne, 2006 WL 3797911 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (noting that 36 categorical exclusions were granted for exploration and
development activities off the central California coast in November of 1999).
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by the leadership at DOI. This term ensured that the concerns
were brought to the attention of a cabinet-level official within the
federal government.
Part (5) of the settlement is fairly self-explanatory. This part
ensures that the court would be able to issue orders to MMS to
force it to comply with the terms of the settlement should its performance on any other parts be found to be deficient. This was
simply a mechanism to ensure that the Defendants would act in
good faith and live up to the terms of the settlement.
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
For many years, 19 1 and with increased intensity in the Lease
Sale 200 comment letters, 19 2 the State of Louisiana has decried
the cumulative and indirect impacts of OCS activity on its coastal
zone. These impacts include cumulative damage to coastal wetlands from increased vessel traffic and pipeline construction, increased strain on State and local infrastructure such as roads and
social services as a result of increased OCS activity, among many
others. 193 These impacts were occurring constantly before the
2005 hurricanes and continue to occur after them. Indeed, had
the storms never occurred, Louisiana would still have had substantial grounds for challenging Lease Sale 200 based on these
impacts, as it attempted to do in 1991.194
Despite the State's efforts to focus much of its challenge on
these constant impacts, Judge Engelhardt seemed unconcerned.1 9 5 There is no discussion of the State's claims of injury
resulting from cumulative and indirect impacts in the Judge's Order and Reasons. It is difficult to divine a reason for this failure to
consider such significant claims. Did the judge simply feel that
the claims lacked merit? Did he misconstrue the State's claims
regarding cumulative and indirect impacts as merely hurricanerelated problems? Did the cumulative and indirect impacts just
get lost in the shuffle of considering so many issues? It is impossible to know. What we do know, though, is that Blanco v. Burton
191. See, e.g., Letter from Scott A. Angelle, Sec'y, La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Renee Orr, MMS (Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
192. See e.g., Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., to Renee
Orr, MMS (Jun. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
193. Id.
194. Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp 486 (E.D. La. 1990).
195. The judge did acknowledge the State's concerns but did not undertake a critical analysis of them. See Order and Reasons at 16-17, Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F.
Supp 486 (E.D. La. 1990) (No. 06-3813).
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taught us nothing about the strength of state challenges to OCS
activity solely for its cumulative and indirect impacts. The judge's
focus on hurricane damage and MMS's failure to adequately study
the impacts of the storms on its prior assumptions about Louisiana's coastal environment made this case more of a commentary
on how the federal government deals with disasters than a test of
state power under federal environmental laws. The hurricane focus, while vindicating the State's concerns and claims in its comment letters on that matter, largely appears to limit the
precedential value of the case. With no critical analysis of MMS's
evaluation of cumulative and indirect impacts in its environmental studies and with no consideration of the federal consistency
requirements of the CZMA, it is difficult to understand how future
courts might rule on OCS challenges based on this case.
It is encouraging that the judge was highly critical of MMS's
less-than-complete considerations of storm impacts on Louisiana's
coastal environment. The judge's strong language and poor view
of that agency's compliance with its own laws should raise a red
flag that will put other courts on alert for corner-cutting by MMS
in the future. 19 6 For example, regarding the inadequate assumptions made by MMS, the judge assessed, "The Court agrees with
the State's submission that the direct, indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed activity are likely to be significantly different; and that the EA provides no real analysis or insight of why
1 97
those impacts are not now different."
Of the CD, the judge commented that "[v]oid of anything more
than a perfunctory passing mention of such, MMS has failed to
include new, pertinent information that reflects significantlychanged circumstances after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita" 198 and
that "MMS's treatment of the Coastal Use Guidelines set forth in
the LCRP is so inadequate as to suggest that proceeding with
Lease Sale 200 was a fait accompli even before the CD was
compiled." 9 9
The judge's harsh assessments of MMS's practice in preparing its environmental documents abound in his opinion and are
too numerous to recount here. These assessments represent one
of the major accomplishments of Louisiana's challenge. They es196. Examples of these assessments have already been quoted in this article. See,
e.g., supra notes 151, 153, & 156 and accompanying text.

197. Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *9 (E.D. La. 2006).
198. Id. at *11.
199. Id.
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tablish a clear message to future courts that, though MMS may be
due deference as a federal agency, that deference must be tempered with a critical analysis of the agency's actions, as they very
well may be substantially inadequate. It seems that, following
Blanco v. Burton, no court should reasonably be able to dismiss a
state's environmental concerns regarding MMS activity without a
comprehensive examination of the process behind its conclusions.
The judge's assessment of MMS also puts the agency in a difficult position should Louisiana decide to challenge its environmental assessments again. The deficiencies noted by the judge
will surely be reexamined in future challenges in an effort to determine whether the agency has taken serious criticisms to heart
and attempted to change its ways or whether it has disregarded
the sound assessments of the judge and continued with a business-as-usual approach. Basically, the judge's strong language
should put MMS on notice that its corner-cutting will no longer be
tolerated. This shot across the bow of MMS should stand as a
stern warning that, should there be no changes in practice, the
next court will not be so deferential to the agency's actions. For
these reasons, Louisiana's case was a resounding success, not just
for Louisiana's coastal environment, but for all coastal states. It
should have the effect of raising the bar on the quality of environmental studies done by MMS, as the next court will certainly not
be as forgiving as this one should nothing change.
The major disappointment of Judge Engelhardt's Order and
Reasons was his failure to find that the Lease Sale rose to the
level of the irreparable harm required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 20 0 Although it is impossible to know for sure
why the judge did not find that irreparable harm would flow from
the Lease Sale, it seems reasonable that his failure or refusal to
critically consider the State's allegations regarding cumulative
and indirect impacts would have to play a substantial role.
Viewed in isolation, as the Defendants urged the judge to
do, 20 1 a lease sale is nothing more than an opening and reading of
bids for potential future exploration and development activities, a
paper transaction. However, a complete understanding of the importance of the lease sale stage of the OCS exploitation process
cannot be had in such isolation. The lease sale process must be
200.
201.
fornia,
Kalen,

Id. at *1.
A similar argument was successfully advanced in Sec'y of the Interior v. Cali464 U.S. 312, 342 (1984), but has since been legislatively overruled. See
supra note 34, at 205-206.
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seen for what it actually is: the final stop on the road to exploitation that affords any comprehensive view of the impacts of all future exploration and development activity. 20 2 The lease sale stage
of the process is where the last comprehensive examination of all
subsequent environmental impacts may be had and where the cumulation of all potential exploration and development activities
should be viewed in concert. 20 3 Never again, for all activities that
flow from one sale, will there be a chance to view their cumulative
harms in a legally required environmental document. 20 4 Once the
lease sale environmental review process is complete, each exploration and development project is only required to produce an environmental document that examines the idiosyncratic implications
of that single activity. 20 5 Indeed, many of these activities, when
viewed in isolation, do not appear to represent significant threats.
Thus, they are permitted and often afforded the status of a categorical exclusion from NEPA review. 20 6 Although it may very well
be that such individual, isolated events do not amount to substantial environmental threats, the cumulation of all of the potential
activities that are given the green light by a single lease sale can,
very easily, amount to a "death by a thousand cuts" to a state's
20 7
coastal environment.
Further adding to the necessity to find the lease sale process
as the final and substantial impact on the entire OCS process is
the volume of industry resources that become committed to
planned activities after the lease sale occurs. 20 8 It is very possible
that, once bids are made and awarded, the winning industries begin to acquire vested rights in their leases that will become more
and more difficult to take away later should environmental harms
be determined at a future date. Indeed, although Judge Engelhardt believed that no harm could occur between his denial of the
preliminary injunction and a hearing on the permanent injunction
202. Kalen, supra note 34, at 208-11. See also, Sarah Armitage, Federal Consistency Under the CoastalZone Management Act-A Promise Broken by Secretary of the
Interior v. California, 15 ENVTL. L. 153, 170 (1984).
203. Kalen, supra note 34, at 208-11.
204. See id.
205. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.202, 282.20, & 282.28.
206. League for Coastal Protection v. Kempthorne, 2006 WL 3797911 (N.D. Cal.
2006); 40 C.F.R. § 15084 (2007).
207. See supra note 117 (discussing cumulative impacts in environmental protection and coastal zone management).
208. Interview with Megan K. Terrell, Assistant Attorney Gen., La. Dep't of Justice, in Baton Rouge, La. (Aug. 14, 2006).
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some ninety days later, 20 9 MMS had already awarded bids long
before the tolling of the ninety days. This means that, should he
have found for the State at the permanent injunction stage, the
industries who had won their bids may very well have had Fifth
Amendment takings claims against MMS for their lost investments in the interim period. Such would have been a precarious
situation; one that could explain the API's change of position the
2 10
day following the judge's issuance of his Order and Reasons.
Due to both the industry interests that are threatened in a
contested lease sale and the fact that a lease sale must be seen as
the gateway to all of the threatened environmental harm stemming from OCS activity, the lease sale stage of the OCS process
must be where irreparable harm is found and it must be where
future courts focus their attention. Later injunctions, at the exploration and development stage, are comparative slaps on the
wrists of the federal government that do little to assist in coastal
protection or to avoid harm to industry.
VI.

ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS THAT
WERE NOT ADDRESSED BY THE JUDGE

The bulk of Judge Engelhardt's Order and Reasons was devoted to the allegations of the State. The Defendants raised numerous defenses to the State's allegations, most of which were not
addressed by the court. The major defenses that were raised related to the State's history of concurring in consistency determinations and the State's own in-state oil and gas leasing activity in
the time since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The latter was addressed by the court and is further considered in Part VII. The
209. Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *1 (E.D. La. 2006).
210. See Motion for Amended Order, American Petroleum Institute as Applicantfor-Intervention, Burton v. Blanco, No. 06-3813 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006). In its Motion for Amended Order, filed on August 15, 2006-the day after Judge Engelhardt
issued his Order and Reasons-the API requested that the court issue an order directing MMS not to open the sealed bids for Lease Sale 200 and require that MMS
provide notice to bidders prior to actually opening the bids in order that the bids may
be retracted, if necessary, based on the outcome of the State's lawsuit. Part of the
impetus for this request was that the API's members were concerned that, should the
State prevail at a trial on the merits-a reality that appeared likely based on the
strong language of Judge Engelhardt's opinion-the bid deposits would have already
been deposited into the U.S. Treasury and would be very difficult to retrieve. See id.
at 2. The API also claimed that allowing the lease sale to go forward in light of a
pending trial would undermine the sealed bid process by essentially tipping the hands
of the bidders when the bids may have to be thrown out and resubmitted. Id. at 3.
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former is addressed here along with some of the other important
issues raised by the Defendants but left unaddressed by the judge.
A.

The State of Louisiana's History of OCS Approval

The Defendants attempted to portray the State as somewhat
opportunistic in its decision to choose 2006 as the time to begin
objecting to lease sales by contrasting the years of concurrences to
OCS activities as a sudden change in policy. Examples of this attempt to use the State's history against it abound in the Defendants' Memorandum:
Considering Louisiana's past practice of concurring on similar
CDs, its continuing approval of oil and gas activities in state
and federal waters, and MMS's extensive review of the potential
environmental harms as set forth in the CDs, EIS, and EAs,
MMS' consistency determination was a reasonable one and cannot be viewed as arbitrary and capricious. 2 11
Perhaps the State was a bit opportunistic, choosing to take a
stand on the protection of its coast in the immediate wake of two
natural disasters that awakened even the most ardent skeptics of
coastal protection to the legacy of decades of environmental degradation. Is this wrong? Surely not. Admittedly, there was a
change in policy from past governors to the Blanco Administration. However, neither of these facts should be dispositive of the
merits of the State's case, and apparently Judge Engelhardt gave
them no credence as evidenced by his lack of attention to such
matters in his Order and Reasons.
Indeed, the Judge's decision not to consider the State's history
of assenting to OCS activities was directly in keeping, whether
conscious or not, with Department of Commerce decisions on exploration and development permit denials under the CZMA. 2 12 In
such matters, the Secretary of Commerce has noted that a state's
prior history with respect to OCS activities is not relevant to the
question of the validity of particular claims. In other words, each
case should be judged on its own merits and a state cannot be estopped from objecting to OCS activities merely because it has not
211. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 121, at 49.
212. See Decision and Findings in the Consistency Appeal of Mobil Exploration &
Producing U.S., Inc. from an Objection by the State of Florida at 9 (U.S. Dep't of
Commerce NOAA Jun. 20, 1995), http://www.ogc.doc.gov/czma.nsf (click on arrow to
the left of "Decisions of the Secretary," select document dated 06/20/1995, then click
on "MobilPensacola.pdf) .
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done so in the past. Such a scenario as the Defendants urged in
their Memorandum would effectively eviscerate the utility of the
consistency provisions of the CZMA and the entire NEPA process
and Judge Engelhardt rightly left this matter unaddressed.
B.

Impacts to the National Interest

A section of the Defendants' Memorandum was devoted to
why the issuance of a preliminary injunction would be detrimental
to the national interest.2 13 Although the Defendants made much
of this issue, the judge left the matter unaddressed.
The Defendants argued that, should a preliminary injunction
be issued to stop Lease Sale 200, "the Secretary will be restricted
from effectively implementing his duty under the OCSLA to develop the mineral resources of the OCS."214 Beyond the statutory
duties of the Secretary to maximize returns from the OCS, an examination of the national interest argument is warranted.
The Defendants' arguments were unsurprising. They focused
on the volatile energy situation worldwide with such comments as,
"[t]he Nation is experiencing a shortage of natural gas and natural gas is difficult to import . . . any delay of this sale imposes
significant and unnecessary economic and national defense costs
on the United States and the public."2 15 The Defendants also
noted that, "if the Lease Sale is cancelled or delayed, losses to the
2 16
U.S. Treasury could top $285 million."
What the Defendants did not touch on (not surprisingly, as it
would have been a statement against their interests) was the energy and national security problems caused by continuing the federal government's wanton disregard for Louisiana's coastal zone.
It is precisely the failure of the federal government to ensure more
environmentally sound activities undertaken pursuant to permitted OCS activities that threatens the continued exploitation of
this resource more than one cancelled lease sale.
The bulk of the infrastructure to support Gulf of Mexico OCS
activities is based in Louisiana's coastal zone. 21 7 The current
coastal land loss, of which the cumulative and indirect OCS im213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 121, at 26-30.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29
Id.
Henry, supra note 9, at 3.
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pacts are a contributor, 2 18 threatens the continued existence of
this infrastructure. Were this infrastructure to be damaged or destroyed, the national interest would be staggeringly damaged.
The failure to recognize the protection of Louisiana's coastal zone
as a primary interest of the protection of national security interests could lead to massive losses in the future. Indeed, as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita recently demonstrated, these threats may
not come from slow, cumulative processes. The damage from such
storms poses a clear and present threat to Louisiana's OCS support infrastructure that can be mitigated by more protective poli2 19
cies towards the land areas within the coastal zone.
Because Louisiana's coastal wetlands also protect the strategic petroleum reserve, 2 20 the interests of not only energy independence as a national security concern, but the actual fuel for the
nation's security depend on the continued survival of Louisiana's
coastal zone. Rather than the Defendants' claims that national
security is threatened if one lease sale does not go forward as
planned, it is certainly threatened if the failure to protect the
coast leads to infrastructure damage that disrupts the delivery of
the OCS products to market.
C.

Attempts to Frame the Case as Being About Money

Although there were no such claims in any document filed by
the State, the Defendants tried to frame the State's environmental compliance challenge as a bid for a greater share of OCS revenues. Such attempts to divert the court's attention from the
environmental issues are evidenced by statements such as the following: "Louisiana has repeatedly suggested that it does not want
to stop OCS oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico; to the
contrary, it wants more federal assistance associated with OCS
activities. MMS has repeatedly advised the State that 'only Con22 1
gress can authorize this funding.'
218. Kalen, supra note 34, at 193. See also Andrew S. Jessen, Comment, Louisiana
and the Coastal Zone Management Act in the Wake of HurricaneKatrina:A Renewed
Advocacy for a More Aggressive Use of the Consistency Provision to Protectand Restore
Coastal Wetlands, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 133, 157 (2006).
219. For a comprehensive discussion of the storm-protective nature of wetlands,
see generally Ryan M. Seidemann & Catherine D. Susman, Wetlands Conservation in
Louisiana: Voluntary Incentives and Other Alternatives, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 441
(2002).
220. See Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences,
and Remedies, 58 TuL. L. REV. 1, at 65 n.251 (1984) (noting the extensive strategic
petroleum reserve infrastructure running through Louisiana's wetlands).
221. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 121, at 29-30.
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The "more money from Congress" issue became the white elephant in the room throughout the entirety of the State's challenge.
It would be a falsehood to state that Louisiana did not and does
not need more money from the federal government to protect its
coastal zone from natural and anthropogenic devastation. However, as the Defendants rightly pointed out, such funding cannot
come from challenges to OCS activities under the theory that
MMS has done a shoddy job of complying with federal law in its
environmental analyses and mitigation programs. 2 22 States have
a sovereign right to take a variety of steps to carry out their public
trust duties. 22 3 Among these steps are such things as congressional delegates lobbying for more financial support from the federal government for environmental protection, 2 24 filing suit
against polluters for restoration and remediation of contaminated
22 6
sites, 22 5 passing more stringent environmental protection laws,
and suing the federal government to ensure the compliance of federally permitted activities with existing environmental laws. 22 7
All of these avenues have been pursued by Louisiana in the past
few years. Thus, Louisiana's challenge to MMS's activities must
be viewed as yet another component of a more environmentally
protective paradigm that is currently in place in the State. Unfortunately, despite numerous attempts to disabuse the media of the
notion that the State's case had merits as an environmental challenge, 228 some continued to view the matter as the litigious blackmail of Congress with the ransom being a greater share of OCS
revenues. 2 29 Thankfully, Judge Engelhardt did not take the bait
from the Defendants on this issue. The matter was not addressed
in his opinion. Conversely, he did find Louisiana's strictly envi222. Id.
223. See generally James G. Wilkins & Michael Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 861 (1992).
224. See Langford et al., supra note 1, at 145-47.
225. See, e.g., State of Louisiana's Petition for Intervention and for Continuance of
Trial Date, Weeks v. Shell Oil Co., No. 100,988 (La. 16th Jud. Dist., Div. A. Sept. 5,
2005).
226. See, e.g., S.B. 665, 2006 Leg. (La. 2006); H.B. 2022, 2003 Leg. (La. 2003).
227. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. 486 (1990); Blanco v. Burton, No.
06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *1 (E.D. La. 2006).
228. See examples of such attempts in articles such as, Pam Radtke Russell,
Blanco Sues to Halt Sales of Energy Leases: HerRound-About Move Seeks More Royalties for State, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 21, 2006, at 1; Blanco Not the First
to Sue Over Oil Leases, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, July 23, 2006, at B1.
229. See Sullivan, supra note 29; see also Landry, supra note 29, and accompany-

ing text.
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ronmental claims to have merit. 230 It is no small vindication of
the State's efforts to deflect uninformed charges of blackmail that
even after Congress has allocated more OCS revenues to the
State, Louisiana continues to strongly criticize MMS's handling of
23 1
environmental matters that affect the State's coastal zone.
D.

Louisiana as the Lone Dissenter Should Be Ignored

One final matter raised by the Defendants but ignored by the
judge in Blanco v. Burton was an implied argument that because
Louisiana was the only state to submit comments on Lease Sale
200 that it should be ignored as a lone dissenter. 2 32 Such a claim
defies logic, as it, if followed to its end, would have the claims of
any party that raises valid objections to any violation of the law by
the federal government, should they be alone in objecting,
branded as meritless for lack of community support. Such arguments amount to a reverse bandwagon argument, whereby the
federal government's claims that "no one else is objecting, so why
are you" would be grounds for ignoring otherwise meritorious issues. Again, as with the other previously discussed claims, Judge
Engelhardt did not accept this one and he apparently found no
need to comment on the lack of objections from Texas, Alabama,
and Mississippi (the other adjacent states for a Western Gulf lease
sale).
Also unconsidered in this implicit claim was the reality that
Louisiana has the most to lose in terms of environmental integrity
from OCS activities in the Gulf of Mexico. This reality results
from Louisiana having substantially more exposed coastline than
Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama and from the bulk of the onshore
support for OCS activities residing within Louisiana's coastal
230. Examples of such a finding are rife in Judge Engelhardt's opinion. For example, the judge stated, "because the CD does not adequately evaluate all of the 'relevant enforceable policies' of the LCRP ...it would appear to have been compiled in an
arbitrary and capricious manner such that the result, i.e., the occurring of the Lease
Sale, was fore-ordained." Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11
(E.D. La. 2006). Another example comes from the Judge's comments on the Section
19 response from MMS:
the State has made a prima facie case that their offhanded dismissal of
the Governor's recommendations with only a general response was not a
serious consideration nor a reasoned determination to accept or reject
these recommendations, in favor of a deliberate and forced effort to meet
a preexisting scheduled lease sale date.
Id. at *14.
231. Henry, supra note 9, at 12-16.
232. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 121 at 35 n.12.
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zone. 23 3 Thus if any state were to object to MMS's flawed environmental analyses, it should be Louisiana first, as it clearly has the
most to lose.
VII.

LESSONS LEARNED

Louisiana's challenge to MMS on OCS leasing represents the
first real comprehensive challenge of such activities in at least two
decades. Obviously, the case, while accomplishing much through
Judge Engelhardt's critical evaluation of MMS's environmental
practices, was not an all-out win for the State. However, lessons
were learned from this challenge, both good and bad, that should
provide guidance to future challengers. Some of these lessons are
addressed in this part and some in Part VIII.
A.

Experiences With the Affidavits and Assistance from
the Scientific and Local Communities

Because the State's lawsuit against MMS was largely an administrative record review, it was not anticipated that there
would be an opportunity to present external evidence and witnesses to refute what the State perceived as the unfounded conclusions contained in MMS's documents. 23 4 The solution to this
was to submit into the record twenty-three affidavits from experts
around the country in coastal ecology, sociology, fisheries, archaeology, tourism, engineering and climatology. 235 Also among the
affidavits gathered by the State were anecdotal affidavits from lo233. See Oil and Gas Licenses on the Outer Continental Shelf Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Marjorie
A. McKeithen, Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources, Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources).
234. Ryan M. Seidemann, How the West was Won: Louisiana's Challenge to Western Gulf Lease Sale 200, Presentation at the 12th Annual Gulf States and Caribbean
Coastal Managers Meeting (2006) (transcript on file with author).
235. The affiants for the State of Louisiana in Blanco v. Burton were: Robert G.
Bea, Ph.D. (engineering); Donald F. Boesch, Ph.D. (coastal environment); Mr. Henri
R. Boulet (local leader); Mr. Windell A. Curole (local leader); Secretary Ang~le Davis
(tourism); Mark S. Davis, Esq. (environmental attorney); John W. Day, Ph.D. (coastal
environment); C. Berwick Duval, Esq. (attorney and local leader); Mr. Ted Falgoust
(local leader); Mark A. Ford, Ph.D. (coastal environment); Mr. Thomas M. French (economics); Robert B. Gramling, Ph.D. (sociology and economics); Mr. Jeffrey D. Harris
(coastal environment); Prof. Oliver A. Houck (environmental attorney); Barry Keim,
Ph.D. (climatology); Mr. Randy Lanctot (wildlife); John Lopez, Ph.D. (coastal environment); Charles R. McGimsey, Ph.D. (archaeology); Mr. Mark Northington (tourism);
Mr. James D. Rives (coastal environment); Parish President Benny Rousselle (local
leader); Christopher M. Stojanowski, Ph.D. (archaeology); Robert Eugene Turner,
Ph.D. (coastal environment). Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *1.
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cal leaders. This allowed the State to make a strong case to the
judge to counter MMS's claims, even in an administrative records
review case.
The State was not alone in bolstering its case with affidavits.
Both the Defendants and API submitted affidavits with their
memoranda, though neither submitted nearly as many as did the
State, nor did the Defendants' and Intervenors' affidavits cover as
many topics as did the State's.
It was clear that the affidavits figured prominently into Judge
Engelhardt's decision-making process. Such is evident by the following language from the Order and Reasons and its accompanying footnote: "Given the substantial evidence before this court that
material changes have occurred since the Fall of 2002 with respect
to the affected baseline environment, as well as the tendentious
conclusions set forth in MMS's EA, the Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits is strong."23 6 The response of the court to Louisiana's affidavits was favorable and, though other courts will
certainly differ in the acceptance of such testimony, it should
serve as a model for future OCS challenges by states.
The key to obtaining such affidavits is the cultivation of close
collaborative relationships with the scientific and local communities early on in the comment process. Louisiana benefited from
the existence of such networks throughout the Lease Sale 200
challenge process. During the comment process, the State had scientific and legal experts with specializations in the relevant fields
review and comment on the State's letters. Caucuses were held
with groups of scientists and with local leaders to frame the issues
and ensure accuracy. Some of these experts ultimately executed
affidavits for the case, some remained behind the scenes as advisors. All of this activity was done on a volunteer basis. There is
little doubt that the strength of the State's case benefited substantially from these relationships early on in the process to ensure
the maximization of intellectual resources at all points of the
challenge.
B.

Careful Adherence to the Entire Process

When Louisiana decided to challenge Lease Sale 135 in 1991,
the decision was made at the very last minute. 2 37 Consequently,
236. Id. at *9.The "substantial evidence" referred to was "the affidavits of Mr. [sic]
Robert G. Bea, Mr. Mark S. Davis and several others attached to Plaintiffs' Memorandum." Id. at *9 n.15.
237. Langford et al., supra note 1, at 138-43.
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the State suffered from a failure to preserve all administrative
challenges and to meet administrative deadlines. 238 The State
lost that case without ever reaching the merits of the challenge. 239
The State learned from its 1991 mistakes and approached
Lease Sale 200 from a more comprehensive perspective. Preparations for a possible lawsuit began at the initiation of the administrative comment process. All deadlines were strictly adhered to
2 40
(though the State did request extensions from time to time).
Every "i" was dotted and every "t" was crossed. Thus, the mistakes of 1991 were not repeated and the State obtained a
favorable decision on most of the merits of its case.
The lesson to be learned from Louisiana's experiences with
OCS challenges is that the process cannot be done properly in a
flying-by-the-seat-of-your-pants fashion. Timelines must be
made, resources must be allocated, deadlines must be met, and all
procedural rules must be followed; there is no room for error or
corner-cutting. Challenges to OCS activity must be well-planned
in advance to avoid the pitfalls of a complex administrative
process.
C.

Louisiana's Oil and Gas Activities as a Factor

One hard-learned lesson by the State was that its own oil and
gas permitting activities within its coastal zone would become an
issue. Although what the State does in its own jurisdiction is immaterial to whether the federal government has complied with the
relevant environmental laws, the Defendants tried to make it an
issue in an effort to deflect some of the blame for degrading Louisiana's coast from themselves. 24 1 Thankfully, the State had a ready
answer to this immaterial issue. However, states planning similar challenges to MMS should similarly be ready to address this
matter.
The basic argument of the Defendants was that why should
they be held to such a stringent standard of environmental compliance when the State does not conduct environmental studies in
advance of oil and gas leasing activities within its borders? The
238. See generally Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. 486 (1990).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Letter from Jim Rives, Acting Adm'r, Office of Coastal Restoration &
Mgmt., Coastal Mgmt. Div., La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Chris C. Oynes, MMS (May
19, 2006) (requesting an extension of a comment period related to Lease Sale 200) (on
file with author).
241. See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 121, at 49.
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answer to this question is simple. If something goes wrong on a
federal lease that causes environmental damage to Louisiana, the
State has no direct right of action for the damages. It cannot sue
the lessees for failure to comply with regulations and it may have
problems proving direct damages from environmental accidents or
violations that occur off its coast. In other words, with federal
leases, the State has no guarantee that its environment is protected if something goes wrong and, worse yet, it has to rely on the
federal government to enforce environmental laws and regulations on the OCS even when the State alleges that the federal
agencies tasked with environmental protection of the coastal zone
are not complying with their own laws. This creates a substantial
problem whereby the State is at the mercy of what the federal government pleases to do on the OCS.
In contrast to the lack of control of environmental compliance
and harms in the OCS, in State waters, there is now a litany of
legal options to ensure environmental protection. As an initial
matter, language is present in the State leases that provides for
site cleanup. 24 2 Such is not the case in federal leases. 24 3 Additionally, the Louisiana Legislature has, over the past few years,
passed legislation to ensure the remediation of environmental
damage.244 These laws give the State the power to ensure
remediation of contamination should anything go wrong on a
State lease. 24 5 Additionally, the Louisiana Attorney General has
the authority to institute actions under the Public Trust Doctrine

242. See

GAS AND OTHER LIQUID OR GASEOUS
4, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/MIN/forms/2000%20blank%201ease%20form.
pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
243. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MANAGEMENT
STATE OF LOUISIANA LEASE FOR OIL,

MINERALS

SERVICE, OIL AND GAS LEASE OF SUBMERGED LANDS UNDER THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDS ACT, FORM MMS-2005 (1986). No pinpoint citation to a specific part of

the lease form is available because there is no enforceable environmental protection
language in the lease.

244. See H.B. 2022, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003); S.B. 665, 2006 Reg. Sess. (La.
2006).
245. It should be noted that since the passage of these laws, the State has proven
that they are not mere window dressing. The State has intervened in no less than
nine suits under these laws and has succeeded in securing remediation in all of the
cases that have been resolved to date. See, e.g., Emergency Petition for Intervention
of Right and For Continuance of Trial Date, Armelise Planting Co. v. BP Amoco Corp.,
No. 25,826 (La. 23d Jud. Dist. 1/20/05); see also Petition for Intervention of Right,
Grisham v. TE Products Pipeline Co., No. 74244-A (La. 10th Jud. Dist. 2/17/05); Petition for Intervention of Right, M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 24,055 (La.
7th Jud. Dist. 9/7/06).
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for the remediation of contamination. 246 None of these operations
are available to the State if environmental harms occur pursuant
to a federally granted lease. 24 7 Judge Engelhardt appeared to be

satisfied with the protection afforded against in-state environmental harms and did not consider the matter further in his opin248
ion aside from a passing mention.
One final comment on the mineral activity within State's
coastal zone is necessary. Through the coastal use permitting process of the LCRP, Louisiana is required to consider cumulative impacts to coastal resources from all activities including mineral
exploration and development. 249 As discussed earlier it is extremely difficult to regulate individual activities on the basis of
their cumulative effects. Mitigation is often piecemeal and isolated and, despite the "no net loss" goal, it does little to help protect and restore Louisiana's coastal wetlands in the
comprehensive manner that will be necessary to accomplish that
mammoth task. 250 To assert that the State can adequately protect and restore its coastal resources against current impacts and
the expected onslaught of new impacts from increased OCS development is misinformed at best, especially in light of the Defendants' characterization of those activities as being in the interests
of national security.251 If MMS is truly concerned about the adverse effects of its actions on the Louisiana coastal zone, it will
work with the State to do a true, comprehensive assessment of all
the cumulative impacts, including those from OCS development,
and find a way to help the State address the problems. We are not
talking about revenue sharing but rather bringing to bear the expertise and experience of the federal government to solve the puzzle of energy needs and environmental protection.
246. See generally Wilkins &Wascom, supra note 213. This too has been used in
recent years. Weeks v. Shell Oil Co., No. 100,988 (La. 16th Jud. Dist., Div. A. Sept. 5,
2005).
247. One exception to this statement is the natural resources damage claims available to a state under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006). This law
would provide for some reimbursement for the cost of the remediation of oil spills.
Indeed, the State makes claims against the Act's fund through the Louisiana Oil Spill
Coordinator's Office, however, the Act only applies to oil spills and does not capture
the bulk of OCS-related problems, such as wetlands degradation and other cumulative and indirect impacts.
248. Blanco v. Burton, No. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *16 (E.D. La. 2006).
249. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 723(A)(2) (2006).
250. See generally Katherine E. Yates, Wetlands Mitigation and Mitigation Banking in Louisiana, 59 LA. L. REV. 591 (1999).

251. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 121, at 29.
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DISCUSSION

Judge Engelhardt's ruling has both beneficial and disappointing components. It is heartening to see a ruling that includes
such a critical analysis of the poor practices of a federal agency
that is supposed to conduct its activities in a manner that minimizes impacts to Louisiana's coastal environment. However,
there were substantial omissions in the judge's ruling. The most
significant of these omissions was the judge's failure to critically
examine or rule on the federal government's compliance with the
consistency provisions of the CZMA. This failure leaves unanswered the question of whether these provisions, enacted to give
coastal states a voice against federally-caused environmental degradation, do actually grant that power to the coastal states. Because the judge chose to largely focus on NEPA compliance, the
most powerful coastal zone protection provisions under federal
law as applies to OCS activity, the CZMA consistency provisions,
remain untested. Because MMS failed to consider ninety of the
State's 94 Coastal Use Guidelines, 2 52 it is hard to imagine how
Lease Sale 200 could have been found to be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the LCRP. Instead of finding NEPA
violations, Judge Engelhardt could easily have stopped Lease Sale
200 under the CZMA consistency provisions, but he did not. It is
impossible to know why these provisions were not a central factor
in the judge's decision making process, but his failure to address
them is a disappointing oversight.
The other particularly disappointing aspect of the judge's ruling in Blanco v. Burton is the fact that the bulk of the decision
focused on the hurricane damage to coastal Louisiana alone. This
critique is in no way meant to marginalize the impacts of the 2005
storms on Louisiana, but rather to say that the case leaves observers of OCS challenges wondering if, in a nondisaster environment,
the State would have garnered such support from the court.
Despite numerous attempts to raise the long-term cumulative
and indirect impacts of OCS activity on Louisiana's coastal zone,
the crux of the ruling in Blanco v. Burton was MMS's failure to
adequately account for the storm damage in its environmental
documents, not its failure to adequately account for the decades of
environmental impacts from OCS activities that occur and accumulate day after day, year after year. The increased vessel
wakes, the periodic construction of new pipelines, the degradation
252. Blanco v. Burton, 2006 WL 2366046, at *12.
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of coastal infrastructure; none of these problems were addressed
by the judge, though they accounted for substantial amounts of
the State's case.
What Judge Engelhardt actually handed down as his ruling
on August 14, 2006, was a disaster opinion rather than a true test
of the power of NEPA, the CZMA, and the OCSLA. Undoubtedly,
MMS took a beating from the judge in his assessments of its handling of environmental analyses. This constituted no small victory
for the State and was a substantial vindication of many of the
State's claims. However, the failure to put the CZIA consistency
provisions to the test was a great failing of this case. Had the
judge focused more broadly on all of the complained-of shortcomings in MMS's environmental work, a more substantial precedent
could have been set in which a state's ability to protect its coast
through the use of its federal consistency authority could have
been proven.
Despite the judge's focus on the failings of a federal agency
following massive natural disasters, the opinion is certainly not
without precedential value in other respects. It certainly puts
MMS on notice that it is no longer acceptable to provide incomplete and unsupported conclusions in its environmental documents. This notice will be extremely useful in the event of future
challenges by other states, as it could serve to establish a pattern
of poor practices for which a new court should have little patience
should the same problems resurface in a new factual context. In
other words, the opinion clearly tells MMS to clean up its act and
if the agency fails to take the strong criticisms to heart and
change some practices, there will be much explaining to do before
future courts.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Although the State of Louisiana did not win its bid for a preliminary injunction to stop Lease Sale 200, it has shown that effective challenges to MMS can be mounted with strong factual
backing. Because the settlement terms were so favorable to the
State, the case was a victory for the coastal environment even if
the opinion, while good in many respects, fell short of expectations
in others.
The opportunity for other courts to test NEPA, the CZMA,
and the OCSLA may be on the near horizon. Louisiana has continued its strong opposition to what it perceives as MMS's insufficient environmental analyses in the post-Lease Sale 200
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environment. The State has submitted comment letters 253 with
harsh words regarding MMS's continued handling of OCS impacts
on Louisiana's coastal environment. 254 The State did decide, however, not to pursue litigation over the 2007-2012 Multisale EIS
and Lease Sale 204.255 However, Louisiana's strong language in
its comment letters continues to hold the spectre of litigation. The
State has also submitted similarly strong comment letters on
Lease Sale 224,256 the lease sale in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico
257
that was authorized by the recent revenue sharing legislation.
It seems that Louisiana's success with its lawsuit over Lease
Sale 200 has spurred nationwide attention to the ability of states
to assert their rights under various environmental laws. In February of 2007, the North Slope Borough and the Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Commission sued MMS under NEPA seeking to enjoin
Lease Sale 202. Lease Sale 202, scheduled for April of 2007, covers federal leases in the Beaufort Sea. 258 The plaintiffs claimed

various insufficiencies of MMS's EA and FONNSI for Lease Sale
202 violated NEPA provisions, including the impacts of seismic
activity on polar bears and whales and the cumulative impacts of
25 9
lease sale-related activities.
Disappointingly, Judge Ralph Beistline in the District of
Alaska was not as insightful in his decision as was Judge Engelhardt in Louisiana. Judge Beistline substantially deferred, probably more than was warranted considering the opinion in Blanco v.
Burton, to MMS and its technical expertise. 260 Like Louisiana in
253. See, e.g., Letter from Scott A. Angelle, Sec'y, La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Renee Orr, MMS (Jul. 16, 2007) (on file with author).
254. Id.

255. This is evident from the consistency determination concurrence for Lease Sale
204. See Letter from Jim Rives, Acting Adm'r, Coastal Mgmt. Div., La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Renee Orr, MMS (June 25, 2006) (on file with author) (dated 2006 in error;
letter should have been dated 2007); Letter from Gerald Duszynski, Assistant Sec'y,
Coastal Mgmt. Div., La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Joseph A. Christopher, MMS (May
14, 2007) (on file with author).
256. Letter from Gerald Duszynski, Assistant Sec'y, Coastal Mgmt. Div., La. Dept.
of Natural Res., to MMS Reg'l Supervisor (Mar. 16, 2007).
257. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 43 U.S.C. § 1331
(2006).

258. MMS,

FINAL NOTICE OF SALE, BLOCKS AVAILABLE FOR LEASING, BEAUFORT SEA

GAS LEASE SALE 202 (2007).
259. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, North Slope Borough v. Min-

OIL AND

erals Management Service, No. 07-cv-00023-RRB (D. Alaska Feb. 26, 2007).
260. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11-12, North Slope Borough, No. 07-cv-00023-RRB, 2007 WL 1106110 (D. Alaska Apr. 12, 2007) [hereinafter
NSB Opinion].
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Blanco v. Burton, the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunc26 1
tion was denied.
The arguments of the defendants were very similar to those
proffered in Blanco v. Burton.26 2 Among these were that "potential injury anticipated by Plaintiffs is speculative and would arise
only, if at all, at the future exploration and development stages
which are subject to additional regulatory control." 26 3 The defendants also decried the impacts of a preliminary injunction to the
national interest of domestic oil and gas development. 264 As noted
at length above, these arguments are circular. If you cannot challenge at the lease sale stage and activities at the exploration and
development stage are subject to a categorical exclusion and are
otherwise too incremental to be identified except cumulatively,
then the legal protections afforded the states with respect to OCS
development are rendered meaningless. Certainly Congress did
not intend this result and it is unfortunate and shortsighted that
Judge Beistline took the defendants' bait.
In addition to the North Slope Borough challenge to Lease
Sale 202, the Center for Biological Diversity ("CBD") has recently
filed suit against MMS on the 2007-2012 Leasing Program in the
District of Columbia Circuit. 265 The CBD's claims include alleged
violations of the OCSLA, the ESA, and NEPA by MMS. 26 6 The
CBD's Petition for Review does not provide any details on its allegations, but the tenor of its comment letter on the Leasing Program is telling of future filings. 26 7 The CBD, in short, claims that
MMS's Draft EIS and Leasing Program contain "deficiencies in
content, analysis, and conclusion . . . so severe as to render the
documents and any decision approving them legally infirm." 268
The noted deficiencies include a failure to analyze greenhouse gas
emissions, use of outdated information, failure to adequately consider cumulative impacts, among others. 2 69 It will be interesting
261. Id. at 4.
262. Id. at 3.
263. Id. at 3.
264. Id.
265. Petition for Review, Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Dep't of
the Interior, No. 07-1247 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 2, 2007).
266. Id.
267. Letter from Kassie Siegel & Brendan Cummings, Dirs., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, to Renee Orr & James F. Bennett, MMS (Nov. 21, 2006) (on file with author).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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to watch the development of this case and its impacts on future
MMS decision making.
Unfortunately, neither post-Blanco v. Burton OCS challenges
raised CZLA concerns with respect to MMS's OCS activities.
Compounding this disappointment is Judge Engelhardt's failure
to put the CZMA to the test in Blanco v. Burton.2 70 It is surprising and disappointing that the North Slope Borough challenge did
not rely on the substandard practices of MMS found by Judge Engelhardt in Blanco v. Burton to bolster its claims. Citation to the
Blanco v. Burton opinion may have gone a long way towards raising Judge Beistline's suspicions of the deference that he afforded
MMS in that decision.
It is unclear, as of yet, if Louisiana accomplished its goal of
achieving greater protection of its coastal environment with its
2006 lawsuit against MMS. There are some indications that MMS
has made some effort to do a better job with its environmental
documents, 2 7 1 and this is encouraging. However, it will likely be
several years before the full effect of the 2006 litigation is known.
Blanco v. Burton should set the burden of proving the insightfulness and utility of its environmental documents high for MMS in
future legal battles. Hopefully, Judge Engelhardt's scathing assessments of that agency will not go unnoticed nor will the warnings of Louisiana, as indicated by its highly-publicized challenge,
go unheeded.

270. This is not to say that the CZMA is being completely unused in a litigious
context. The recent decision from the District of Maryland in AES Sparrows Point
LNG, LLC v. James T. Smith, Jr., 2007 WL 1826889 (D. Md. 2007), demonstrates that
local governments do still have some authority under the CZMA. Unfortunately, this
case, which covered the siting of a liquefied natural gas terminal near Baltimore, was
largely about zoning issues and did not directly address environmental harm. Additionally, the California Coastal Commission (CCC) is currently testing the power of
the consistency provisions of the CZMA, though not as they relate to OCS activities.
The CCC has sued the United States Navy in the Central District of California, claiming that sonar tests off the California coast will adversely impact marine mammals
and sea turtles, thus making the proposed action inconsistent with the state's coastal
management plan. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief and Writ of Mandamus, California Coastal Comm'n v. United States
Dep't of the Navy, No. CV 07-01899 (Cent. Dist. Ca. Mar. 22, 2007); see also, Carolyn
Raffensperger, A State Preempts the U.S. Navy, 24 ENVTL. FORUM 18 (2007).
271. See MMS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 2007-2012: WESTERN PLANNING AREA SALES 204, 207, 210, 215, AND 218; CENTRAL PLANNING AREA SALES 205,
206, 208, 213, 216, AND 222 (2007); see Letter from Jim Rives, Acting Adm'r, Coastal
Mgmt. Div., La. Dep't of Natural Res., to Renee Orr, MMS (Jun. 25, 2006) (on file with
author) (dated 2006 in error; letter should have been dated 2007).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/4

48

